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CLIMATE CHANGE HAS BEEF WITH FEDERAL 
CATTLE GRAZING 
 
John David Janicek 
 




Increased emissions of greenhouse gases are causing the Earth s 
climate to change producing extreme temperatures and dangerous 
conditions for mankind. Livestock is positioned at a unique juncture of 
the current and future fight against atmospheric temperature rise. These 
animals produce the very nutrients a growing world population needs to 
survive, and the meat they yield plays an important role in all world 
cultures. Unfortunately, the production of livestock is considered one of 
the most significant emitters of greenhouse gases, of which cattle is the 
largest contributor. Therefore, a balance must be struck between 
livestock production and preservation of the Earth. One way to rebalance 
this relationship would be to reform the federal cattle grazing permit 
system. 
Federal land in the Western United States contains hundreds of 
millions of acres and makes up over half the landmass of some states. 
The Bureau of Land Management and Forestry Service oversee most of 
the federal land in the West. On this land, these agencies operate grazing 
 
* John David Janicek obtained a Juris Doctorate degree from SMU Dedman School of 
Law and earned a Bachelor of Arts degree from Texas A&M University. He works at the 
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programs in which they allow private ranchers to apply for permits to 
graze cattle on the lands for a fee. The fee is based on an archaic formula 
that has not been updated in decades and is based on outdated economics 
of cattle grazing. As a result, the permit fee is far below market value, 
and the government operates the cattle grazing programs at a deficit of 
tens of millions of dollars annually. 
The subsidizing of cattle grazing on land owned by the American 
people, which directly exacerbates climate change, is wrong. Action 
should be taken to redress the impacts on the climate and the costs to the 
federal government. Modernizing the permit fee can be accomplished by 
a two-fold change. First, the minimum rate has to be raised to make 
certain the government is at least getting close to a fair price. This 
avenue was pursued but ultimately not accomplished in the Obama 
Administration. Second, the permits should be auctioned to the public for 
a price in excess of the minimum rate, and the permit length shortened to 
allow more frequent fee adjustment through auctions. Additionally, the 
increased revenue resulting from these changes should be allocated to 




Few can be cattlemen, 1 is certainly a true statement, but the effects 
of cattle impact us all. Increasing emissions of greenhouse gases are 
causing the Earth s climate to change, producing e treme temperatures 
and dangerous conditions for mankind. Livestock sit at a unique juncture 
of the current and future fight against atmospheric temperature rise. 
These animals produce the very nutrients a growing world population 
needs to survive, and they often hold significant roles in various 
cultures.2 Unfortunately, cattle in particular emit dangerous greenhouse 
gases3 that will need to be curbed to slow global warming and its perilous 
effects.  
 
1 Proud Cattle Men (@proudcattlemen), INSTAGRAM, 
https://www.instagram.com/proudcattlemen/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2020). 




rom%20plants); Kimberly Winston, The Splainer: Wha  Make  he Co  Sacred o 
Hindus?, WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/religion/the-splainer-what-makes-the-cow-
sacred-to-hindus/2015/11/05/acdde3e2-840c-11e5-8bd2-680fff868306_story.html.  
3 Veerasamy Sejian et al., Global Warming: Role of Livestock, in CLIMATE CHANGE 
IMPACT ON LIVESTOCK: ADAPTATION AND MITIGATION 141, 151 (Veerasamy Sejian et al. 
3
Janicek: Climate Change Has Beef with Federal Cattle Grazing
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2021
Washington Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 
 351 
People often look at the vastness of the American West and wonder, 
who owns all this land?  Generall , the answer is the federal 
government, and thus the American people. To benefit food production, 
utilize natural resources, and provide employment, the federal 
government allows private citizens to graze cattle on much of this land 
by granting grazing permits.4 These permits typically allot ranchers a 
certain number of cattle to graze on specific plots of federal land in 
exchange for a fee paid to the government.5 This is a fair enough 
premise. But the government has run the program at a loss of tens of 
millions of dollars for decades.6 Running the program at a loss would 
potentially be acceptable under different circumstances, but when this 
same cattle production contributes to the heating of the planet and 
destruction of federal land, it must be improved.  
The federal government must stop running its grazing program at a 
huge financial loss by increasing the base fee to graze the land. In 
addition, when grazing permits reach their renewal stage, they should be 
put up for auction on the open market so they can be sold for a rate 
reflecting their value. The money received in excess of the base permit 
fee would then go to an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) fund 
that partners with the private sector to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  
This paper will begin with a brief discussion of livestock s particular 
impact on global warming. Next, it will describe the development of 
federal regulations for cattle grazing on public lands and the current 
regulatory scheme. The paper will then explain why the current 
regulations, specifically the PRIA formula, are failing miserably. It will 
propose a relatively straight-forward solution, the B.E.E.F. system, 
which addresses both the fee receipts deficit and the impact of cattle 
grazing on climate change. The paper labels this solution the Bettering 
Environments and Economies Fund (B.E.E.F.) system. Lastly, there will 
be a discussion of potential issues and arguments against the B.E.E.F. 
system. 
 
I. IMPACT OF CATTLE ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
The scientific community is nearly unanimous in the viewpoint that 
the Earth s atmosphere is warming, causing a m riad of negative impacts 
 
eds., 2015); M. Melissa Rojas-Downing et al., Climate Change and Livestock: Impacts, 
Adaptation, and Mitigation, 16 CLIMATE RISK MGMT. 145, 152 (2017).  
4 See infra Section III. 
5 See infra Section III.B.1. 
6 See infra Section IV.B. 
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to society.7 The scientific community also agrees that human behavior is 
contributing to rising temperatures through the emission of greenhouse 
gases (GHGs) and other actions like deforestation.8 Since the year 1750, 
human activity has increased atmospheric levels of the GHGs carbon 
dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O).9 From 1880-
2012, on average, the land and ocean surface temperatures have risen 
0.85 degrees Celsius.10 In fact, climate models suggest global surface 
temperatures are already 0.5 degrees Celsius (0.9 degrees Fahrenheit) 
warmer than the 1986-2005 average global surface temperature, 
indicating an exponential rate of warming.11 It is e tremel  likel  that 
more than half of the observed increase in global average surface 
temperature from 1951 to 2010 was caused by the anthropogenic 
increase in greenhouse gas concentrations and other anthropogenic 
forcings together. 12 An increase of 2 degrees Celsius above pre-
industrial average global temperature is the customary marker (though 
partially politically calculated) of when the impacts of climate change 
will be disastrous.13 These disastrous results include: increased weather 
related mortality; extreme floods, droughts, and wildfires; increased 
human displacement and poverty; food production difficulties; and 
ecosystem failures.14  
The global raising of livestock is a significant factor in the emission 
of greenhouse gases and contributes more GHG emissions than the entire 
transportation industry.15 A major stud  b  the United Nations Food and 
 
7 Scientific Consensus: Earth's Climate is Warming, NASA, 
https://climate.nasa.gov/scientific-consensus/ (last visited May 12, 2021).  
8 Id. 
9 Thomas Stocker et al., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for 
Policy Makers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 3, 11 (Thomas 
Stocker et al. eds., 2013). 
10 Id. at 5. 
11 Rebecca Lindsey & LuAnn Dahlman, Climate Change: Global Temperature, NAT L 




12 Stocker, supra note 9, at 17. 
13 Why 2 Degrees Celsius Is Climate Change  Magic N mber, PBS (Dec. 2, 2015), 
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/why-2-degrees-celsius-is-climate-changes-magic-
number (Additionally, the 2 degrees Celsius number was chosen by political bodies as a 
number that would be convenient to enable collective action. Though it matches up with 
some estimations of the appropriate goal, the number is not solely science based.) 
14 Christopher B. Field et al., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for 
Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 1, 
6-7 (Christopher Field et al eds., 2014).  
15 Rojas-Downing et al., supra note 3, at 152. 
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Agriculture Organization (FAO) concluded that livestock production is 
one of the top two or three most significant contributors to the most 
serious environmental problems, at ever  scale from to local to global,  
and it is a major stressor on man  ecos stems and the planet as a 
whole. 16 Livestock production accounts for about 14.5% of total 
greenhouse gas emissions.17 Methane and nitrous oxide are the two most 
significant greenhouse gases released from livestock production.18 
Methane s effect on global temperature rise is 28 times that of CO2. 
Nitrous oxide is even more potent as its effect on global temperature rise 
is 265 times that of CO2.19 Emissions from livestock constitute 44% of 
the global anthropogenic emissions of methane and 53% of the emissions 
of nitrous oxide.20 Livestock GHG emissions come from enteric 
fermentation (the digestive process of breaking down the plant s 
biomass), respiration, excretions, manure application, production of feed 
crops, and processing of products.21 The United States is responsible for 
the fourth largest amount of methane emissions globally.22 
Cattle is responsible for a majority of global livestock GHG 
emission, contributing 65% of the sector s emissions.23 Cattle raised for 
beef specificall  are responsible for 45% of the entire livestock sector s 
GHG emissions.24 A majority of these emissions come from enteric 
fermentation.25 The gaseous waste from this process is mainly removed 
from the body through eructation.26 Of all livestock, beef production 
releases the highest emission rate per unit of product, at 300 CO2 
 
16 Debra L. Donahue, Trampling the Public Trust, 37 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 257, 293 
(2010). 
17 Giampiero Grossi et al., Livestock and Climate Change: Impact of Livestock on 
Climate and Mitigation Strategies, 9 ANIMAL FRONTIERS 69, 69 (2019). 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Rojas-Downing et al., supra note 3, at 151. 
21 Id. at 152. 
22 Id. at 154. 
23 Key Facts and Findings, FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/197623/icode/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2020). 
24 Grossi et al., supra note 17, at 70. 
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equivalents27 per kilogram of protein produced.28 Meanwhile, chicken 
and pork products produce less than 100 CO2 equivalents per kilogram.29 
In addition to cattle s impact on climate change, global warming will 
have an impact on cattle. A decrease in natural water in these regions, an 
expected result of climate change, will result in a decrease in forage, 
further straining the land.30 Even the plants that are able to grow will 
have increased lignin and cell wall components which will reduce the 
digestibility and decrease nutrient availability for cattle.31 Other expected 
impacts of global warming on cattle include increased water demands, 
decreases in body mass, decreased reproduction rates, and higher 
mortality rates.32 
While demand for livestock products is expected to increase 100% 
by midcentury, climate change will affect competition for natural 
resources, biodiversity loss, heat stress, and quality of feed and forage.33 
The focus of this paper is on direct GHG emissions, but livestock also 
have other negative impacts on the environment like land use change and 
degradation, air and water pollution, and biodiversity destruction.34 
Experts agree that any comprehensive solution to climate change must 
address livestock production.35  
 
II. FEDERAL CATTLE GRAZING REGULATORY STRUCTURE 
 
Federal regulation of cattle grazing in the West covers sixteen states: 
Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, New 
Mexico, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, 
 
27 A carbon dio ide equivalent or CO2 equivalent, abbreviated as CO2-eq is a metric 
measure used to compare the emissions from various greenhouse gases on the basis of 
their global-warming potential (GWP), by converting amounts of other gases to the 
equivalent amount of carbon dio ide with the same global warming potential.  Glossary: 




28 Key Facts and Findings, supra note 23. 
29 Id. 
30 Hillary M. Hoffmann, Demand Management, Climate Change, and the Livestock 
Grazing Crisis in the Great Basin, 6. GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 14, 21 (2016). 
31 Rojas-Downing et al., supra note 3, at 147. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 146. 
34 Id. at 151. 
35 Donahue, supra note 16, at 260 (citing U.N. Found. & Sigma Xi, Confronting Climate 
Change: Avoiding the Unmanageable and Managing the Unavoidable 95 AM. SCIENTIST 
1, 69-70 (2007)). 
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Washington, and Wyoming.36 Federal lands make up a large portion of 
many of these states. On the extreme end in Nevada, federal land exceeds 
80% of the entire land in the state.37 Other states that are largely 
comprised of federal land include Utah (63.1%), Idaho (61.9%), Oregon 
(52.3%), and Wyoming (46.7%).38 
 
A. Statutory Provisions 
 
1. Before regulation 
 
Cattle grazing on federal land has not always been regulated. The 
industry grew immediately following the Civil War, but it mostly 
consisted of nomadic herders moving unrestricted across the land.39 In 
1862, Congress passed the Homestead Act which opened federal land to 
ownership by anyone who settled and cultivated it.40 This and other laws 
distributing federal lands increased competition for public land, and 
ranchers began fencing off the areas of public land on which they 
generally grazed.41 Tensions reached their peak in the 1880s and 1890s 
with range wars  between cattle and sheep ranchers.42 The first attempt 
by Congress at addressing range problems was the Unlawful Inclosures 
Act of 1885.43 This Act prohibited the fencing off of public lands to limit 
private claims for public land made without color of title.44 However, the 
law s impact on conflicts between ranchers was minimal because it did 
not address the underlying issue; there was not enough water and forage 
for the quantity of grazing livestock.45 By 1897, the federal government 
had recognized grazing as a legitimate use of Western federal lands.46 In 
1905, the Forest Service (FS) established a public policy for National 
Forests to allow grazing so long as it did not negatively impact forest 
 
36 CHRISTINE GLASER, CHUCK ROMANIELLO & KARYN MOSKOWITZ, COST AND 
CONSEQUENCES: THE REAL PRICE OF LIVESTOCK GRAZING ON AMERICA S PUBLIC LANDS 9 
(2015) [hereinafter GLASER ]. 
37 CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42346, FEDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP: OVERVIEW AND DATA 8 
(2020). 
38 Id. at 7-8. 
39 GLASER, supra note 36, at 7. 
40 Hoffmann, supra note 30, at 19. 
41 GLASER, supra note 36, at 7. 




46 Why Does the Forest Service Permit Livestock Grazing on National Forest System 
Lands?, U.S. FOREST SERV., https://www.fs.fed.us/rangeland-
management/grazing/allowgrazing.shtml (last visited May 11, 2021). 
8
Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 11, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol11/iss3/7
Washington Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 
 356 
conservation.47 This regulation had limited impact and overuse continued 
to deteriorate the land.48 
 
2. Taylor Land Grazing Act 
 
The first major effort at sweeping regulation to curb the destruction 
of Western lands was the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934.49 The stated goal 
of this law was to stop injur  to the public gra ing lands b  preventing 
overgrazing and soil deterioration, to provide for their orderly use, 
improvement, and development, to stabilize the livestock industry 
dependent upon the public range, and for other purposes. 50 The Act 
gave the Secretary of the Interior the responsibility to regulate cattle 
grazing on 80 million acres of unreserved federal land.51 The Secretary 
was to organize grazing districts and issue permits to ranchers.52 It 
created a preference that the permits be granted to persons within or 
near  the gra ing district, and it set the permit duration at 10 ears.53 The 
Act allowed for ranchers to make alterations to their permitted lands that 
were necessary for grazing livestock.54 It also provided for 25% of the 
fee to be used b  the Secretar  for the construction, purchase, or 
maintenance of range improvements  and for 50% of the fee to be given 
to the State in which the district was located.55  
This Act had its desired impact: implementation of the Act resulted 
in overall livestock reduction and elimination of nomadic herds.56 It also 
set in place the tenets that still make up the backbone of current 
regulations. In 1946, the Grazing Service (the division of the Interior 
handling grazing responsibilities) merged with the General Land Office 
to form the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) within the Department 
of the Interior.57 
 
 
47 Id.  
48 GLASER, supra note 36, at 7. 
49 See Taylor Grazing Act, THE LIVING NEW DEAL, 
https://livingnewdeal.org/glossary/taylor-grazing-act-1935/ (last visited May 11, 2021). 
50 Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-482, 48 Stat. 1269, 1269 (1934) (prior to 
1936 amendment). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 1270. 
53 Id. at 1271. 
54  Id. 
55 Id. at 1273. 
56 GLASER, supra note 36, at 7. 
57 Id.  
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3. Granger-Thye Act and the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act (FLPMA) 
 
The Granger-Thye Act of 1950 brought the Forest Service cattle 
grazing regulations in line with BLM regulations by creating a similar 
grazing permit and fee structure. It also authorized land improvement 
from funds generated by grazing fees and set permit durations at a 
maximum of ten years.58  
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act became law in 1976 
and governs how the BLM manages its lands. The Act requires that the 
public lands be managed in a manner that will protect the quality of 
scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air and 
atmospheric, water resource, and archeological values; that, where 
appropriate, will preserve and protect certain public lands in their natural 
condition. 59 Moreover, the Act requires the Secretary of Agriculture and 
the Secretary of the Interior establish a fee for the grazing permits under 
their control that is equitable to the rancher and the United States.60 Of 
that fee, 50% is used for range rehabilitation, protection, and 
improvements  because the federal lands were deteriorating in 
qualit . 61 Of that 50%, half is put into projects taking place where the 
money was derived and the other half is distributed to other projects 
determined by the relevant Secretary.62 Importantly, the law also grants 
priority of renewal to the rancher currently holding the permit if they and 
the land are in good standing.63 This is still the law the BLM operates 
under in 2021. 
 
4. Public Rangelands Improvement Act (PRIA) 
 
Another significant law impacting federal cattle grazing permits 
today is the Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978 (PRIA). In 
enacting PRIA, Congress recogni ed that vast segments of public 
rangelands are  in an unsatisfactor  condition. 64 The government 
determined that overgra ing ma  ultimatel  lead to unpredictable and 
undesirable long-term local and regional climatic and economic 
 
58 Laws, Regulations, and Policies, U.S. FOREST SERV., https://www.fs.fed.us/rangeland-
management/aboutus/lawsregs.shtml (last visited May 11, 2021). 
59 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8).  
60 43 U.S.C. § 1751(b). 
61 43 U.S.C. § 1751(b). 
62 Id. 
63 43 U.S.C. § 1752(c).  
64 Hoffmann, supra note 30, at 21. 
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changes. 65 One way PRIA addressed the overgrazing was making 
changes in management policies to resolve conflicting legal demands on 
ranchers and improve cooperation among the relevant government 
agencies.66 The most important aspect of PRIA, for the purposes of this 
paper, was the establishment of a formula that automatically set grazing 
fees for the lands managed by the BLM and FS. The fee is calculated to 
determine the economic value of the land to the rancher, and will be 
discussed in greater detail in the following section. The calculation 
determined the grazing fee should be $1.23 per AUM67 for the years 
1979-1985.68 The calculation did not provide for regional variation; all 
the regulated land in the 16 states covered by PRIA would operate under 
the same permit fee. The fee was not allowed to increase by more than 
25% from the previous year.69 
When the trial period of the PRIA formula ended, President Ronald 
Reagan signed Executive Order 12548.70 The Order made the PRIA 
formula the permanent method for calculating the grazing permit fee but, 
importantly, set a minimum fee of $1.35 despite any calculation results 
below that total.71 It also kept the cap of a 25% annual fee increase.72 
This is the current system that determines BLM and FS grazing fees. 
 
5. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
 
In 1970, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) was 
enacted to to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to 
the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of 
man. 73 It requires government agencies to consider the environmental 
impacts of their proposed actions that significantly affect[] the quality 
of the human environment. 74  NEPA is significant to federal regulation 
of cattle grazing because the issuance of a federal grazing permit 
generally triggers the NEPA process.75 
 
65 Id. 
66 Jimmy Carter, Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978 - Statement on Signing 
H.R. 10587 into Law - October 27, 1978, 1978 Pub. Paper 1875 (1978). 
67 See infra Section B.1. (explaining the standardized unit). 
68 43 U.S.C. § 1905. 
69 Id. 
70 Exec. Order No. 12548, 3 C.F.R. 188 (1986). 
71 GLASER, supra note 36, at 8. 
72 Id. 
73 42 U.S.C. § 4321. 
74  42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). 
75  GLASER, supra note 36, at 7. 
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NEPA imposes what man  ranchers consider an onerous process  
that requires a good deal of time and effort.76 At a minimum, to have 
their permit renewed, ranchers will generally have to create a document 
called an Environmental Assessment (EA).77 If their conduct will clearly 
have significant impacts  on the environment, the rancher will be 
required to engage in the more complex Environmental Impact Statement 
(EIS) process.78 The EA process requires the applicant to consider and 
report [p]erceived environmental consequences of proposed actions and 
a range of alternatives. 79 It typically begins with a Proposed Action 
document produced by the rancher.80 This document begins with the 
gra ing histor  and  management of the last ten ears. 81 The 
applicant and agency (FS or BLM) will also gather data to identify the 
improvements or needs of the land and the corresponding desired 
conditions.82 Then the relevant government agency will prepare the EA.83  
Next, the applicant will work with the agency on issue identification 
and scoping. Scoping is the process of receiving public commentary on 
the proposed plan and is required for all FS applications.84 For the BLM, 
only major proposed actions require public scoping.85 During scoping, 
the agency circulates documents from the applicant that include: a 
recitation of issues of concern; description of the allotment; past project 
successes and failures; mitigating factors; monitoring data; goals; 
environmental impacts, and more.86 Based on resulting comments, the 
applicant will help develop alternative plans with less environmental 
impact and analyze the effects of the new plans, though they are not 
required to adopt the alternatives.87  
Finally, the agency will issue a Decision Notice (for the FS) or a 
Decision Record (for BLM) with a determination of a Finding of No 
 
76 Todd Neeley, Proposed NEPA Change Lauded by Ranchers, Progressive Farmer (Jan. 
9, 2020), https://www.dtnpf.com/agriculture/web/ag/news/world-
policy/article/2020/01/09/trump-proposal-said-speed-approval. 
77 National Environmental Policy Act Review Process, EPA (Sept. 17, 2020), 
https://www.epa.gov/nepa/national-environmental-policy-act-review-process. 
78 See id. 
79 JIM SPRINKLE ET AL., NEPA FOR RANCHERS 1, 
https://extension.arizona.edu/sites/extension.arizona.edu/files/attachment/gila-nepa-for-
ranchers.pdf (last visited May 12, 2021). 
80 Id. at 19. 
81 Id. at 2. 
82 Id. at 2-3. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 5. 
85 Id. Scoping is required for all FS proposed actions including EAs. Id. 
86 Id. at 5-6. 
87 See id. 
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Significant Impact  if the agenc  finds that the permit will have no 
significant impact on the environment.88 A finding that the permit will 
have a significant impact  requires undergoing the Environmental 
Impact Statement process.89 After the conclusion of one of these 
processes, the permit applicant can implement the planned actions but 
the  still need to monitor their actions because mistakes, new 
information, changed conditions, or unanticipated effects  ma  require 
alteration of the plan.90 In 2020, the Trump Administration shortened the 
NEPA review length as it applies to federal cattle grazing.91 Ranchers 
have long felt such a complex system is not appropriate for their conduct 
and this adjustment is unlikely to change their outlook.92 
 
B. Federal Management 
 
1. Bureau of Land Management and Forestry Service 
 
The Forest Service, under the Secretary of Agriculture, and the 
Bureau of Land Management, under the Secretary of the Interior, are the 
primary federal entities responsible for managing the federal grazing 
program. The BLM manages 154.1 million acres of land that is available 
for cattle grazing.93 Most of the BLM s land consists of arid and semi-
arid land that was not claimed during the disposition of most Western 
land through the Homestead Act and related laws.94 The FS manages an 
additional 93 million acres of cattle grazing lands95 on U.S. forestlands 
and National Grasslands. The FS organizes its data based on geographic 
regions, the largest of which is the Intermountain Region (Nevada, Utah 
and Idaho) containing 24,107,000 acres of federal grazing land.96 BLM 
 
88 Id. at 12. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Jeff Brady, Trump Overhauls Key Environmental Law to Speed Up Pipelines and 
Other Projects, NPR (July 15, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/07/15/891190100/trump-
overhauls-key-environmental-law-to-speed-up-pipelines-and-other-projects. 
92 See Carol Ryan Dumas, Ranchers Welcome NEPA Modernization, CAP. PRESS (Jan. 15, 
2020), https://www.capitalpress.com/ag_sectors/livestock/ranchers-welcome-nepa-
modernization/article_97d55592-37b4-11ea-b008-6fdaeb808287.html.  
93 CAROL HARDY VINCENT, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS21232, GRAZING FEES: OVERVIEW AND 
ISSUES 1 (2019) [hereinafter GRAZING FEES]. 
94 Brian L. Frank, Cows in Hot Water: Regulation of Livestock Grazing Through the 
Federal Clean Water Act, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1269, 1278 (1995). 
95 GRAZING FEES, supra note 93, at 1. 
96 GLASER, supra note 36, at 9-11. 
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and FS lands are also generally available for purposes other than grazing 
because both agencies are multiple-use agencies.97 
The permitting systems of the FS and the BLM are similar. Both 
agencies divide their lands into allotments of widely varying sizes.98 The 
BLM requires permit applicants to own or control a base property that is 
capable of serving as a base of operation for livestock use of public 
lands within a gra ing district. 99 The FS generally requires base 
property as well.100 Permits are generally for a duration of ten years with 
non-competitive renewal.101 The permit holder does not obtain title to the 
land they are grazing.102 
Permits are issued for a certain number of cattle determined by the 
particular allotment s Animal Unit Month (AUM) capacity. An AUM is 
a standardi ed unit of measurement of the amount of forage necessar  
for the complete sustenance of one animal unit for a period of 1 
month. 103  In practice, one AUM means the use of public lands b  one 
cow and her calf, one horse, or five sheep or goats for a month. 104 So 
one hundred acres of lush ranching land will have a higher AUM number 
permitted than one hundred barren acres.105  
The BLM issued 17,886 grazing permits and leases in 2017 which 
resulted in 8,820,617 AUMs grazing that year.106 From 2002-2013, the 
BLM averaged 8,359,496 AUMs grazing its land.107 The four states with 
the most BLM grazing lands are Nevada (39,331,000 acres), Utah 
(19,321,000 acres), Wyoming (15,917,000 acres), and New Mexico 
(11,533,000).108 
 
97 Id. at 6; see BLM  M l iple U e Manda e   What Does That Even Mean?, Bureau 
of Land Mgmt. (Mar. 9, 2016), 
https://www.blm.gov/or/districts/burns/newsroom/files/multipleuse.pdf. 
98 GLASER, supra note 36, at 8. 
99 43 C.F.R. § 4110.2-1(a)(1) (2021). Base propert  ma  also be contiguous land, or, 
when no applicant owns or controls contiguous land, noncontiguous land that is capable 
of being used in conjunction with a livestock operation which would utilize public lands 
outside a gra ing district.  Id. § 4110.2-1(a)(2). 
100 How Do I Get a Grazing Permit?, U.S. FOREST SERV., 
https://www.fs.fed.us/rangeland-management/grazing/permits.shtml (last visited Nov. 3, 
2020). 
101 GLASER, supra note 36, at 8. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 8 n.2. 
104 Id.  
105 The land area needed to produce an AUM will differ considerabl  depending on soil 
productivit  and precipitation.  Id. at 12. 
106 GRAZING FEES, supra note 93, at 1. 
107 GLASER, supra note 36, at 12. 
108 Id. at 36 (numbers based on 2004 data). 
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In 2017, the FS had 6,146 active permits and 6,803,425 AUMs 
grazing.109 The average number of AUMs grazing FS land from 2002-
2013 was 6,335,542.110 Together with BLM AUMs, the two agencies 
managed over 15.6 million AUMs grazing on federal lands in 2017.111  
Other federal agencies also manage grazing lands, for example the 
National Park Service, the Department of Defense, and the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service.112 Altogether these agencies manage less than five 
million acres with less than one million AUMs.113 Because the impact 
these agencies have on national meat and greenhouse gas production is 
relatively insignificant, they are not covered in detail in this paper.  
The BLM and FS vary in how they distribute the revenue from the 
permit fee. Both put the greater of 50% of fee revenue or $10 million 
into a Range Betterment Fund (RBF)114 in the Treasury.115 The grazing 
fees are deposited separately and are subject to appropriations.116 The 
RBF is used for rehabilitation and improvement projects like fence 
construction, weed control, reseeding, and water development.117 But, the 
other 50% is where the two agencies vary. The FS gives the Treasury the 
remaining 50%, half of which the Treasury retains for itself and half of 
which is distributed to the states under a revenue-sharing agreement 
which is ultimately passed to local governments.118 On the other hand, 
the BLM only returns 12.5% of the collected fee to the states for lands 
within grazing districts; the remaining amount goes to the US 
Treasury.119 When the land is outside of a grazing district, the BLM gives 
the states 50% of the collected fee.120  
The permits issued by the agencies set out terms and conditions for 
use of the land such as the time period in which grazing is acceptable.121 
 
 
109 GRAZING FEES, supra note 93, at 2. 
110 GLASER, supra note 36, at 14. 
111 GRAZING FEES, supra note 93, at 1-2. 
112 GLASER, supra note 36, at 12. 
113  U.S. GOV T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-869, LIVESTOCK GRAZING: FEDERAL 
EXPENDITURES AND RECEIPTS VARY, DEPENDING ON THE AGENCY AND THE PURPOSE OF 
THE FEE CHARGED 17 tbl.2 (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-
869. 
114 Referred to as a Range Improvement Fund by the BLM and Range Betterment Fund 
by Forest Service. 
115 GRAZING FEES, supra note 93, at 4. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 5. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 GLASER, supra note 36, at 12. 
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III. FAILURES OF THE CURRENT REGULATORY SCHEME 
 
A. An Archaic Formula 
 
As discussed above, the permit fee per AUM that applies to BLM 
and FS land is set according to the calculation of the PRIA formula.122 
Before this formula became law, the BLM and the FS tried to charge fees 
that would either cover their costs for operating the program or were 
market-based.123 The introduction of the PRIA formula was not intended 
to be a shift away from the goal of recovering costs associated with 
operating the programs. The PRIA formula was intended to reflect[] 
annual changes in the costs of production  and the economic value of the 
land.124 It may have succeeded in serving that purpose at one point in its 
54 year existence, but it does not anymore.125  
The PRIA fee is determined b  three factors based on costs in 
western states of (1) the rental charge for pasturing cattle on private 
rangelands [FVI], (2) the sales price of beef cattle [BCPI], and (3) the 
cost of livestock production [PPI]. 126 The formula is as follows:127  
 
The base year fee for forage in 1966 was $1.23, which was 
determined by the cost difference of cattle production on private versus 
public lands for that year, not including grazing fees.128 Forage Value 
Index (FVI) is based on private rates for cattle grazing on non-irrigated 
land in the West as published b  the USDA s National Agricultural 
Statistics Service (NASS).129  
Before 1973, FVI was often the sole consideration in determining 
grazing fees.130 But that ear the American National Cattleman s 
Association proposed a new formula that would take into account 
 
122 See supra Section II.A.4. The FS Grasslands use a different, but similar formula that 
results in a similar number to the PRIA formula. See 36 C.F.R. § 222.51 (2021). 
123 GLASER, supra note 36, at 19-20. 
124 43 U.S.C. §§ 1901(a)(5), 1905. 
125 U.S. GOV T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 113, at 50-51. 
126 CAROL HARDY VINCENT, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS21232, GRAZING FEES: OVERVIEW 
AND ISSUES 3 (2012). 
127 GLASER, supra note 36, at 22. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 23. 
130 L. ALLEN TORELL ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF THE PRIA GRAZING FEE FORMULA, 3 
tbl.1 (2001), available at https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6551231.pdf. 
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ranchers  abilit  to pa  fees.131 This innovation was the first introduction 
of the Beef Cattle Price Index (BCPI) and the Prices Paid Index (PPI).132 
The BCPI is determined by calculating the weighted average of the 
annual beef sales price in the West the prior year.133 The PPI is based on 
various categories of livestock production costs as published by the 
USDA s NASS.134 
The addition of PPI and BCPI to the PRIA formula did not make it 
more accurately reflect annual forage values.135 The problem with PPI is 
that it has almost always been a larger number than BCPI.136 As a result, 
a negative BCPI-PPI value is added to FVI. Because FVI is constantly 
decreasing naturally, the resulting fee cannot increase at a similar rate to 
private fees.137 If the base fee is being multiplied by a rate that is already 
below that of the private fee on comparable land, it statistically cannot 
keep up. Adding these two components to the fee formula ruined the 
predictive abilit  of the formula. 138 For example, if the BCPI-PPI 
factors had not been added, the fee for the year 2000 would have been 
$3.94/AUM.139 Instead, for fee year 2000 the minimum fee of $1.35 was 
charged because the formula calculated a $1.12 fee.140 In the extreme, 
from fee years 2009-2011 the PRIA formula calculated a negative permit 
fee value.141 From 2000-2013, the minimum legal fee was charged in all 
but four years.142 For example, in 2013 FVI was 507, BCPI was 548, and 
PPI was 994.143 This large PPI value resulted in a $0.75 calculated PRIA 
fee.144  
For the last 15 years, BLM and FS grazing fees have been lower than 
other federal, private, and state grazing fees.145 State grazing fees have 
wide variation but stay far above the PRIA fee.146 In 2013, Arizona 




133 GLASER, supra note 36, at 23. 
134 Id. 
135 TORELL ET AL., supra note 130, at 4. 
136 See GLASER, supra note 36, at 25. 
137 Id. at 23. 
138 Torell, at 4. 
139 Id. 
140 GLASER, supra note 36, at 25. 
141 Id. 
142 See id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 GRAZING FEES, supra note 93, at 8. 
146 See generally GLASER, supra note 36, at 29. 
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the top fee of $65-$150/AUM.147 There is no reason to believe these state 
lands are inherently far better for cattle grazing than federal lands in the 
same regions.148 For private lands in 2017, the 16 Western states had an 
average AUM fee of $23.40.149 Oklahoma had the lowest average at 
$11.50/AUM and Nebraska had the highest average at $39.00/AUM.150 
Private fees are determined by supply and demand principles with factors 
such as quality of forage, water availability, and grazing infrastructure.151 
These fees dwarf the fee being charged for cattle to graze on over 95% of 
federal lands in the West.152 Additionally, these large variations in fees 
from state to state show the irrationality of the BLM and FS charging the 
same fee for a permit in every state. The same variables in the land that 
impact the value of permits on private lands impact the value of federal 
land grazing permits, even if it is not reflected in the permit price.153 For 
example, private rates for non-irrigated lands in Colorado range from 
$3.72 to $38 per AUM.154 
At its inception in 1966, the $1.23 base fee was about one-third of 
the private grazing fee.155 When the PRIA formula went into effect, it 
was about 24% of the cost of grazing on private lands.156 From 2000-
2012, the highest ratio of federal to private fee was in 2004, when private 
fees averaged 12.26% of the cost to graze on federal land.157 The low 
during that period was in 2013 when the fee only represented 6.72% of 
the private fee.158 
If the BCPI-PPI factors had not been added to the PRIA fee 
calculation, the grazing fee would be about $6 today, nearly four and a 
half times the minimum rate being charged.159 This fee would still be 
 
147 Id. Texas is not in the West and is an outlier with the next highest rate being Nebraska 
at up to $39. Id. 
148 See infra Section V (rebutting claims that there is an understanding of the superiority 
of private land). 
149 GRAZING FEES, supra note 93, at 8. 
150 Id. 
151 GLASER, supra note 36, at 24. 
152 See U.S. GOV T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 113, at 16-17 (the federal 
grazing lands not regulated by the FS or BLM make up less than 5% of the total). 
153 Livestock operator costs are . . . not uniform on BLM and USFS land.  GLASER, 
supra note 36, at 24. 
154 Id. at 27. 
155 Id. at 23. 
156 Id. at 24. 
157 See id. at 25. 
158 Id. at 24. 
159 See id. at 23. 
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approximately a third of the usual private grazing fee, just as it was 
intended to be when PRIA was first conceived.160 
Other federal agencies with public lands that permit cattle grazing 
have different fee structures. In 2004, when PRIA was $1.43, the 
National Park Service charged an average of $4.30 and the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service had an average fee of $11.24.161 Some agencies use a 
competitive bidding process while others set the fee based on the average 
prevailing rate for the particular area.162 Even the FS, on FS lands in the 
Eastern U.S., uses market-based methods to determine the grazing fee.163 
Similarly, six states award permits for state lands to the highest bidder 
and another six states determine their fee based on the relevant market 
prices.164 
 
B. Federal Subsidy for Private Grazing 
 
[I]t is generall  recogni ed that [] the federal government does not 
receive a market price for its permits. 165 While not receiving a full 
return of value on the program expenditures may occasionally be 
acceptable to taxpayers, the federal government loses tens of millions of 
dollars each year operating the cattle grazing program. The PRIA 
formula has prevented the BLM and FS from charging reasonable permit 
fees, and as a result, inflation-adjusted receipts they have collected from 
the fees have steadily declined for decades. In 2002, the agencies 
collected $27.6 million dollars in permit fees adjusted for 2014 dollar 
value.166 In 2014, the agencies collected only $18.5 million.167 If the 
agencies had charged the private market rate for non-irrigated land from 
2002-2012, they would have collected $261 million annually.168 Instead, 
by charging a ridiculously low fee, the most the two agencies collected 
combined in any year over that same period was less than $28 million.169 
As explained above, only about a quarter of that money is returned to the 
Federal Treasury, and the rest is directed to land rehabilitation and local 
governments. 
 
160 See id. 




165 See U.S. GOV T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 113, at 49-50. 
166 GLASER, supra note 36, at 15. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 19. 
169 Id. at 15. 
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It is very costly to the federal government, and thus the U.S. 
taxpayer, to run these federal grazing programs. Congress appropriates 
tens of millions of dollars each year in excess of the money collected 
through fees, to both agencies in order to operate these programs.170 In 
2014, the direct grazing appropriation (which includes RBF funds and 
the general management program) for the FS was $58,356,000 and for 
the BLM was $85,280,000, a total of $143.6 million.171 The agencies 
collected $18.5 million in fees, so receipts amounted to only 13% of the 
appropriations.172 From 2002-2014, the highest percent of receipts to 
appropriations was 18% and the lowest was 9%.173 
The PRIA formula-created deficit means the federal subsidy to the 
BLM and the FS for livestock grazing programs has been over $120 
million annually for the years 2002-2014.174 To be clear, this loss is 
attributable to a decline in grazing fees, not in the number of grazing 
cattle, which has been stable over the time period.175 To cover the cost of 
direct appropriations to the BLM and FS programs in 2012, the permit 
fee would have needed to be $10.25, but the actual fee charged was 
$1.35.176 These numbers are based on direct costs of the specific grazing 
permit programs only. In addition, other government agencies carry out 
34 related programs that benefit the permit holders directly or remediate 
damage from their operations.177 Examples are federal programs to kill 
native predators and remove federally protected horses during times of 
drought.178 
Federal cattle grazing is so extensively subsidized by the government 
that one can see why livestock ranching on public lands is often referred 
to as welfare ranching. 179 Each permit-holding rancher has received an 
 
170 See id. at 16. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. at 17. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 In fact, both agencies saw slight increases in the amount of grazing from the years 
2002-2016. BLM saw a 5.2% increase in AUMs, and FS has a 1.1% increase in the 
amount of AUMs grazing over that time. CAROLE HARDY VINCENT, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 
R44932, STATISTICS ON LIVESTOCK GRAZING ON FEDERAL LANDS: FY2002 TO FY2016, 
(2017) at 8. 
176 GLASER, supra note 36, at 19. 
177 Vickery Eckhoff, The Real Price and Consequences of Livestock Grazing on 
America  P blic Land , Western Watershed Project (Feb. 12, 2015), 
https://www.westernwatersheds.org/sustainable-cowboys-welfare-ranchers-american-
west/. 
178 Id.  
179 Robert H. Smith, Livestock Production: The Unsustainable Environmental and 
Economic Effects of an Industry Out of Control, 4 BUFF. ENV T L.J. 45, 73. 
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annual subsidy of about $24,000, all so that they can pay less to graze a 
cow for a month than one might pay for a single canned meal for their 
pet.180 It is no wonder that this minority of ranchers is so loud in their 
opposition to innovations in the system. 
 
C. A Few Ranchers Benefit, We All Pay 
 
The current regulatory scheme is not only illogically based on a 
strict, number-driven calculus, but it is inequitable to ranchers writ large 
and the American public. The notion of a Western cattle rancher is 
romantic, but it is a fallacy. Most public land is grazed by only a few 
permit holders. Of all federal grazing land, 50% is controlled by less than 
5% of the nation s ranchers, leaving onl  the remaining half of the land 
to potentially be occupied by the traditional notion of a Western cattle 
rancher.181 But it is not. One study concluded that half of permit holders 
are hobby ranchers that are not dependent on their ranching income and 
may be using it primarily as a tax write-off.182 Moreover, many permit 
holders are not small-town ranchers, but Fortune 500 companies and 
billionaires.183 Examples of such permit holders are Texaco, Anheuser-
Busch, John Hancock, and Bill Hewlett and David Packard (of Hewlett-
Packard).184 The idea of a ranch that has been passed down through the 
family for generations is also a delusion; most permit holders have not 
been in business for more than a generation.185 
Even if the romanticized version of Western ranching were reality, 
the cost of subsidized federal grazing would outweigh the social benefit. 
As other industries become obsolete through modernization, it is 
doubtful that a majority of Americans will desire to spend millions of 
taxpayer dollars to prop up an ineffective system that destroys the 
unique, beautiful land they indirectly own. Generally, the actions we 
permit to destroy the environment are profitable or beyond government 
regulation. For example, the federal government has permitted oil 
exploration and drilling on its property to the detriment of the lands, but 
 
180 Eckhoff, supra note 177. 
181 Smith, supra note 179, at 80; see also Smith, supra note 179 ( 1992 report b  the 
General Accounting Office, a research arm of Congress, found that 16 percent of BLM 
permit holders have 76 percent of the gra ing rights. ). 
182 Raymond B. Wrabley Jr., Cowboy Capitalism or Welfare Ranching? The Public 
Lands Grazing Policies of the Bush Administration, 29 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 
85, 99 (2008); Debra L. Donahue, Western Grazing: The Capture of Grass, Ground, and 
Government, 35 ENVTL. L. 721, 730 (2005) [Hereinafter Western Grazing ].  
183 Wrabley Jr., supra note 182, at 98. 
184 Id. 
185 Western Grazing, supra note 182, at 730. 
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[t]he amount of annual revenue that Federal mineral development 
provides to the U.S. Treasury is second only to that provided by the 
Internal Revenue Service. 186 Federal cattle grazing is neither 
unregulatable nor profitable.187 Cattle ranching in the West is not 
fundamentally dishonorable, but given the damage it does to the 
environment, grazing on public lands at an additional cost to the taxpayer 
is wrong. 
 
IV. A MARKET BASED SYSTEM WITH A RAISED FLOOR 
 
A. Prior Proposals 
 
It has been recognized for decades that the system is broken. 
Attempts at improvements have been made in the past. During the 104th 
Congress (1995-96), a bill was passed by the Senate that would have 
changed the permit fee.188 The formula proposed under that bill would 
have removed operating costs and private permit rates from the equation 
and instead only considered the gross value of the production of beef.189 
It would have increased the fee by about $0.50 per AUM. Unfortunately, 
it did not become law.190 In the following Congress (1997-98), the House 
of Representatives passed a similar bill to change the formula to be based 
on a twelve-year average of beef production costs and revenues.191 It also 
failed to become law. Since the 105th Congress, there has not been a bill 
passed in either chamber affecting the PRIA formula fee.192  
Recent presidential administrations have taken up efforts to change 
the fee and permit system without success. The Clinton Administration 
proposed a change that would have increased the base fee to $3.96 per 
AUM and adjusted the rate based on annual FVI changes.193 The 
amendment to the law was included in an Interior Department spending 
bill which was met b  a fierce western Republican filibuster. 194 
 
186 About Oil and Gas, U.S. DEP T. OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., 
https://www.blm.gov/programs/energy-and-minerals/oil-and-gas/about (last visited May 
11, 2021). 
187 Even completely ending the public land grazing permit system would only result in 
elimination of less than 20,000 low-wage jobs. See Western Grazing, supra note 182, at 
728. 





193 Id. at 6-7; Wrabley Jr., supra note 182, at 94. 
194 Frank, supra note 94, at 1286. 
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Although the Administration did eventually get a federal land grazing 
bill passed into law, congressional objections prevented an increase to 
permit fees.195 The subsequent Bush Administration proposed ending the 
depositing of 50% of BLM receipts into the RBF, and instead depositing 
them in the General Fund of the U.S. Treasury.196 This would not have 
changed the fee charged but would have decreased the losses of 
operating the program. It also did not become law. 
The most recent attempt at fee change occurred in the Obama 
Administration. The Interior Secretary Sally Jewell proposed the addition 
of an administrative fee per AUM that would be phased in to reach a 
$2.50 fee per AUM in 2017.197 Given the 8,820,617 AUMs authorized 
that year, this fee would have generated over $22 million more in 
receipts for the BLM alone. Though receipts would not have reached 
anywhere near the cost of operating the program, this change would have 
increased revenue from grazers by 148%.198 Because the administrative 
fee is separate from the AUM permit fee, it would not have violated the 
statutory restriction that the permit fee cannot increase more than 25% 
annually.199 The proposal faced harsh opposition from the cattle industry 
and never became law.200 
The Trump Administration s changes were not fee-based but instead 
focused on fle ibilit  for ranchers.201 A 2017 agenc  initiative s goal 
was to improve BLM s management of gra ing on public lands b  
offering livestock operators greater flexibility to more readily respond to 
changing on-the-ground conditions, such as drought or wildfire. 202 The 
BLM currently has changes to administrative provisions pending that 
would overhaul gra ing regulations for public lands. 203 The changes  
 
195 CAROL HARDY VINCENT, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL21232, GRAZING FEES: AN OVERVIEW 
AND CURRENT ISSUES (2005). 
196 GRAZING FEES, supra note 93, at 7. 
197 Tay Wiles, Will Public-lands Ranchers Pay More for Grazing?, High Country News 
(Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.hcn.org/articles/obama-s-trying-to-hike-grazing-fees. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
200 See Beltway Beef, Obama  B dge  Propo e  o Increa e Federal Land  Gra ing Fee, 
BEEF MAG. (Feb. 15, 2012), https://www.beefmagazine.com/regulation/obama-s-budget-
proposes-increase-federal-lands-grazing-fee. 
201 Bureau of Land Mgmt., Programs: Natural Resources: Rangelands and Grazing: 
Livestock Grazing: Outcome Based Grazing, https://www.blm.gov/programs/natural-
resources/rangelands-and-grazing/livestock-grazing (last visited Nov. 4, 2020). 
202 Id. 
203 EELP Staff, Public Lands Grazing Rules, ENV T AND ENERGY L. PROGRAM (Jan. 15, 
2017), https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/2017/12/public-lands-grazing-rule/ (last visited Jan. 
14, 2021). 
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mostly addresses NEPA and the permitting process, and do not change 
the fee formula.204 
The Biden Administration has promised to make addressing climate 
change a central focus of federal policy.205 As evidenced by Executive 
Order 14009, issued days into the new presidency, the climate plan will 
include changes to the management of federal lands.206 It appears likely 
the Biden Administration will renew the efforts of the Obama 
Administration to create a more equitable federal cattle grazing program. 
 
B. Improved Solution and the B.E.E.F. 
 
Cattle production on public lands is contributing to the warming of 
the environment and the federal government is not only allowing it, but 
subsidizing it. Mandating even a small decrease in the number of cattle 
raised on public lands would be highly controversial and is unlikely to 
have a significant impact on decreasing global GHG emissions. Instead, 
if the government collects receipts for grazing comparable to those 
charged on state and private lands, it could decrease the inequitable 
subsidy, as well as redistribute money to mitigate the GHG impact of 
cattle on public lands. 
The PRIA fee is the reason the BLM and FS federal cattle grazing 
programs run at huge deficits. But America is not committed to this 
future, and the federal grazing fee should be brought in line with the 
principles it was created under and operate similar to typical lessors. 
Modernizing the permit fee can be accomplished by a two-fold change. 
First, the minimum rate has to be raised to make certain the government 
receives a fairer price. Second, the permits should then be auctioned to 
the public for a price in excess of the minimum rate, and the permit 
length should be altered to allow more frequent fee adjustment through 
auctions. Additionally, the increased revenue resulting from these 
changes should be allocated to efforts to mitigate cattle production s 
effect on climate change. 
 
 
204 See Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for the Proposed 
Revision of Grazing Regulations for Public Lands, 85 Fed. Reg. 3410 (Jan. 21, 2020). 
205 The Biden Plan for a Clean Energy Revolution and Environmental Justice, 
https://joebiden.com/climate-plan/ (last visited May 11, 2021). 
206 It is the polic  of m  Administration to lead the Nation's effort to combat the climate 
crisis by example specifically, by aligning the management of Federal procurement and 
real property, public lands and waters, and financial programs to support robust climate 
action.  Executive Office of the President, Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and 
Abroad (Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/02/01/2021-
02177/tackling-the-climate-crisis-at-home-and-abroad.  
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1. Minimum fee as a floor 
 
There is no one correct way to determine the minimum fee. It can be 
determined by: (1) a flat rate (increasing with inflation); (2) a formula 
similar to PRIA; or (3) adding an administrative fee onto the current rate 
(as proposed by the Obama Administration). The flat fee could take the 
cost back to its origins by being set at one-third the cost of the average 
private rates in the year it is adopted. It should change annually to 
account for inflation. This plan would have resulted in a $6.69 fee for 
2012.207 But over time, this method runs into the problem that the 
number may no longer be close to the future market difference of private 
and public lands. It also puts the fee above the market rate for some 
federal lands that have little grazing value. 
A simple formula based on principles similar to the flat fee could be 
more responsive to the market. Just removing BCPI and PPI from the 
PRIA formula would make the calculation much more in line with 
private markets because PVI serves that purpose alone.208 But the 1.23 
multiplier in PRIA no longer has any factual basis. Since it was based on 
market conditions in the 1960 s, there is no reason to keep it. Instead, a 
formula based purely on FVI is the simplest way to have the floor rate 
track the market. 
The third way, the proposal by the Obama Administration, is to keep 
the PRIA formula and add an administrative cost onto the permit fee. 
This solution is simple and could be done without passing a law through 
Congress. It is debatable what the additional fee should be, but 
something similar to the Obama plan in the $3.00 range could be 
palatable to ranchers. This may require frequent changes to track the 
market and could be removed by any subsequent administration.  
When looking at the cost per AUM now, a proposal to increase the 
fee up to six times the current rate (proposal 1) may seem extreme. In 
reality, other federal agencies and state agencies have charged, and 
continue to charge, rates in excess of $10 per AUM.209 And when 
compared to private grazing rates, the new floor fee is still minuscule. As 
explained above, around a $7.00 AUM fee still only serves the purpose 
of bringing the fee to 1/3 the private fee, which was considered equitable 




207 See GLASER, supra note 36, at 25. 
208 See TORELL ET. AL., supra note 130, at 4. 
209 GLASER, supra note 36, at 29. 
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2. Market-based mechanisms as a ceiling 
 
The real innovation in this plan comes with the return to market 
based principles.210 As described in Section IV-A, the quality of the land 
and resulting permit value varies widely state to state and even within a 
state. Instead of mandating a set permit price, markets should govern the 
price in excess of the floor rate. First of all, permits will not be issued for 
ten-year periods. To keep the markets active and competitive, the permit 
length should be shortened to six years. The next item to change is the 
automatic renewal preference for permit holders. The agency must 
instead put the permit rights up for a competitive auction at renewal time. 
This is an approach the federal government applies to allocation of 
multiple types of permits. For example, the federal government auctions 
both sulfur pollution allowances211 and wireless spectrum licenses212 in a 
competitive, public bidding process. 
The agency will physically post information about an upcoming 
auction of the permit in relevant places, as well as in an online 
marketplace that they create. This will take place about one year prior to 
the renewal date in order to give time for multiple bids, as well as time 
for people to enter the market if they need to purchase property in the 
area as usually required by the agencies. This could have the additional 
positive impact of increasing land value in areas with highly sought-after 
grazing land. The auction will not be blind because knowledge of 
competing bids would increase transparency and increase fairness. At the 
end of the bidding period, the current permit holder will be given the 
option to outbid the current highest bid. It will benefit all parties to leave 
in place some preference for the permit holder and continuity, without 
automatically allowing them the permit at next-to-nothing. If a rancher 
over-extends themselves with their bid and goes bankrupt during their 
permit term, the permit will go back up for auction. 
The market-based approach allows the agency to charge a fair fee for 
the land. We know this system can work because it has already worked 
with other federal and state agencies.213 Even the FS already uses 
market-based methods for determining fees in the eastern national forest 
 
210 This is not the first paper to advocate for a market-based approach, but as explained 
below the purpose is not just to increase government receipts. See TORELL ET AL., supra 
note 130, at 6. 
211 Gabriel Chan, Robert Stavins, Robert Stowe & Richard Sweeney, The SO2 
Allowance-Trading System and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: Reflections on 20 
Years of Policy Innovation, 65 Nat l Ta  J. 419, 432-33 (2012). 
212 Fed. Commc n Comm n, About Auctions (Aug. 9, 2006), 
https://www.fcc.gov/auctions/about-auctions. 
213 See infra Section IV.A. 
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lands. 214 The federal government should not be leasing public land at 
the same rate in California as it does in Arizona, when privately-leased 
lands average permit rates are for $19.50/AUM in California and 
$9.00/AUM in Arizona. A fee determined by the market considers 
regional variations in the quality of federal land. It also allows variation 
from adjacent properties. If one permit allocation has extensive natural 
water access and the neighboring property does not, it is equitable for the 
former to pay a higher rate. 
 
3. Allocation of revenue to climate mitigation 
 
The purpose of the increased base fee is to decrease the financial loss 
at which the program is operating. Moreover, the market-based auction 
serves an additional purpose: the B.E.E.F. Every cent charged in excess 
of the base permit rate should be collected and deposited into a fund that 
serves to mitigate the impact of cattle production on climate change. The 
Bettering Environments and Economies Fund (B.E.E.F.) will be separate 
from the RBF and serve a different purpose. The RBF assists in 
rehabilitating grazed lands; this will likely have some positive 
environmental impact, but the B.E.E.F. will have the specific purpose of 
mitigating GHG emissions. The B.E.E.F. will be used as those operating 
the fund see fit, whether that be partnerships with the private sector to 
reduce emissions215 or creating carbon sinks.216 Instead of keeping the 
fund within the agency collecting the receipts and having two funds 
operated by agencies with other primary focuses (BLM and FS), the 
money could be redistributed to a new Division in the EPA with the 
relevant expertise and connections to the proper private entities to do the 
work.  
The PRIA fee is only currently in effect through an executive order, 
so any administration could raise the base permit fee. But to accomplish 
the auction system, there would have to be congressional changes to the 
statutes controlling the BLM and FS. As climate change becomes a top 
 
214 GLASER, supra note 36, at 28. 
215 For example, the government could enter partnerships to fund research into artificial 
carbon sequestration technology. David Chandler, MIT Engineers Develop a New Way to 
Remove Carbon Dioxide from Air, MIT NEWS (Oct. 24, 2019), 
https://news.mit.edu/2019/mit-engineers-develop-new-way-remove-carbon-dioxide-air-
1025. 
216 The fund could be used to replant forests on public lands to offset the GHG emissions. 
See Michael Jenkins, Rupert Edwards & Genevieve Bennett, How to Rebuild Global 
Carbon Sinks, FOREST TRENDS: VIEWPOINTS (Mar. 7 2019), https://www.forest-
trends.org/blog/rebuild-carbon-sinks/. 
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issue for many voters217 and politicians, changes such as this may receive 
broader support than attempts at change in past decades. 
These proposed improvements taken together greatly improve the 
challenging political position the government is in. No rancher is being 
forced to shut down; if ranchers run a profitable operation and are willing 
to pay as much as their neighbor for their permits, then they can ranch as 
long as they want. The raised floor could substantially decrease the 
amount the U.S. taxpayer is subsidizing cattle grazing on land they 
indirectly own. And the B.E.E.F. can help address the negative climate 
externalities of cattle production. 
 
V. ADDRESSING POTENTIAL ISSUES 
 
The primary argument for keeping the permit fee at such a low value 
compared to private rates is that the private leases provide higher quality 
land and amenities so that it is, in fact, equivalent to federal lease prices. 
But, there is no general agreement about the comparabilit  of private 
and public land forage. 218 Advantages of private lands may include the 
ability to sublease, watering, fencing, and other services provided by the 
land owner.219 Still, it seems highly unlikely that private forage and 
services are regularly 20 times more valuable than the public land forage. 
This paper is not advocating that they charge the same rate per AUM, 
just that they better reflect their market value. If the public land forage 
was agreed to be worth 1/3 of private forage fifty years ago, how can it 
be on average worth less than 1/10 the value now? Because no one 
knows with certainty the comparative value of land across the board, it is 
logical to allow the market to decide. Cattle ranching in the West must be 
able to turn a profit at a higher permit cost than the current permit rate, or 
the private leases on those adjacent lands would not exist. 
In the past, federal agencies have argued that an auction system 
would be disruptive to the permittee and community stability.220 That is 
not necessarily true and should not be the primary concern. Studies have 
shown that the loss of a federal grazing permit would not result in most 
ranchers selling their lands; they would instead usually try to adjust their 
operations.221 Moreover, allowing the current permit holder the 
 
217 Alec Tyson, How Important is Climate change to Voters in the 2020 Election?, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR. (Oct. 6, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/10/06/how-
important-is-climate-change-to-voters-in-the-2020-election/. 
218 TORELL ET AL., supra note 130, at 5. 
219 GRAZING FEES, supra note 93, at 9. 
220 TORELL ET AL., supra note 130, at 5. 
221 Western Grazing, supra note 182, at 729. 
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opportunity to match the highest bid will decrease disruption and allow 
continuity. The only ranchers potentially displaced would be those that 
cannot run their cattle operation as efficiently as other ranchers that 
could afford to outbid them. Western cattle ranching should be subject to 
the same market forces as every other industry. Even if some individuals 
are unfortunately priced out of the market, it is not clear that this would 
result in a net decrease in AUMs grazing.222 Where ranchers were 
surviving on government-subsidized permits, their operations were not 
economically sound. Much of the West is not fit for raising cattle, and 
there are insufficient economic or virtuous reasons to force it to be used 
as such.223 The disruption of Western ranching life is a negative 
externality of climate change, but hopefully other laws aimed at climate 
change will provide funding to reeducate, retool, or relocate those that 
cannot afford their permits.  
The agencies have also posited that the scattered and isolated nature 
of some lands makes it unlikely there will be a competitive bidding 
system.224 This issue is resolved by keeping a permit rate floor instead of 
using a pure auction, because even if only one rancher wants the land, it 
will lease for a higher and more reasonable rate than it currently is. Even 
if the auction might fail for some properties, that does not mean it will 
not often succeed.225 Relatedly, some may argue bidding will not actually 
be open to an entire market of people, but only a handful of neighbors 
because of agency requirements that permit holders have adjacent land to 
the permitted land to serve as a base property. This may be the case, and 
it is acceptable if the auction does not always have a plethora of 
bidders.226 But times when a permit is being auctioned at a price 
significantly below its market value may result in entrepreneurial 
ranchers purchasing a base property to get access to the permit 
opportunit . Accordingl , a piece of propert s pro imit  or access to 
federally permitted land should increase property values.227 
Others may argue an auction system along with the permit length 
decrease puts more strain on the agencies  administrations which are 
already backlogged.228 Normally that may be correct, but there is a fix for 
 
222 GRAZING FEES, supra note 93, at 7. 
223 See Smith, supra note 179, at 73. 
224 TORELL ET AL., supra note 130, at 6. 
225 See id. 
226 Land with access to BLM grazing land is already sold at premium. See GRAZING FEES, 
supra note 93, at 9. 
227 Id. (noting that the capitali ed value of gra ing permits t picall  is reflected in higher 
purchase prices that federal permit holders pay for their ranches. ). 
228 See generally id. at 11 (showing, for example, a backlog of 7000 permit renewals in 
2017). 
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that as well. The removal of NEPA requirements for federal grazing 
permits would greatly speed up the review process.229 NEPA serves to 
force consideration of the impact of government actions on the global 
climate. If the B.E.E.F. is serving to mitigate the emission of GHG of 
cattle grazing on federal lands while the RBF and other programs address 
other environmental impacts, there are few net negative environmental 
harms to be considered.230 Cattle production would still harm the lands 
and water systems, but the RBF fund already serves to remedy those 
impacts. As a result, and to appease ranchers, permit applicants should 
no longer be required to complete NEPA Environmental Assessment.231 
There are other examples of certain government actions being exempted 
from NEPA review,232 so this is not a revolutionary concept. In fact, the 
Department of Energy Office of Environment, Health, Safety and 
Security recently published a document listing NEPA categorical 
exclusions for 79 government agencies.233 For example, the BLM has a 
categorical e clusion for the [i]ssuance of future interest leases under 
the Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands where the subject lands are 
alread  in production. 234 Though the exact impact of B.E.E.F. is unclear 
and mitigation is not an exact 1:1 science, providing a categorical NEPA 
exclusion in exchange for implementation of the B.E.E.F. system is a 
fairly equitable trade. Even though ranchers would welcome the NEPA 
exclusion, it is probable they will argue this is not sufficient 
compensation for increased permit cost. As a result, enacting such a 
change in the law would be challenging because the food animal industry 
 
229 See id. at 12. 
230 It seems unlikely that the RBF is returning the lands to an entirely pre-cattle condition, 
but there is a lack of available information on the success or failures of RBF 
rehabilitation efforts. As the B.E.E.F. solution, including its proposed NEPA exclusion, is 
premised on the presumption that the RBF is rehabilitating these lands, it will be assumed 
that the RBF is generally meeting the goals of rehabilitating the rangelands. If not, further 
appropriations to the RBF may be required.  
231 The law already provides that [t]he issuance of a gra ing permit or lease b  the 
Secretary [of the Interior] concerned may be categorically excluded from the requirement 
to prepare an environmental assessment or an environmental impact statement  under 
certain circumstances when applying for a BLM permit. Carl Levin and Howard P. 
Buck  McKeon National Defense Authori ation Act for Fiscal Year 2015, Pub. L. No. 
113-291, 128 Stat. 3791 (2015). 
232 It is called a categorical exclusion when a government action is not required to 
complete a NEPA review. 
233 Categorical Exclusions, COUNCIL ON ENV T QUALITY, https://ceq.doe.gov/nepa-
practice/categorical-exclusions.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2020).  
234 Id. 
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is one of the largest monetary contributors to federal political candidates 
and has a powerful lobbying influence.235  
One might point out that cattle ranching on Western federal lands 
only accounts for about 3% of American s cattle production, so the 
impact of the improvements from the B.E.E.F. system may not alter the 
course of global warming.236 That may be true, but the change is still 
important due to the unique qualities of the problem. Because this 
ranching is taking place on land owned by U.S. citizens, while being 
subsidized by U.S. taxpayers, ranchers should be accountable for the 
destruction of the globe even if its impact is limited. The B.E.E.F. system 
is a compromise to others that have argued that grazing on Western 
federal lands should end all together.237  
It must be acknowledged that the subsidies to cattle production 
largely benefit the American consumer by lowering the cost of beef they 
purchase. But as explained above, the cattle produced on federal lands 
makes up a small portion of American consumption and therefore is not 
likely to alter the beef market if it becomes slightly more expensive to 
produce. The subsidies that generally make beef significantly less 
expensive are the subsidies to the farms that produce feed for cattle 
which is then sold to ranchers at low prices.238 Slightly raising production 
prices for federal land permit holders would have no impact on the cost 
of producing cattle through feed lots.  
Finally, it would be naive to think these logical improvements, that 
would garner popular public support, would not be controversial. If the 
failures of multiple Congresses and Administrations to address the issue 
are not sufficient proof, the Cliven Bundy saga is demonstrative. Cliven 
Bundy grazed federal lands for decades without a permit, arguing that the 
land belonged to Nevada, and that his ancestors used the land before the 
federal government claimed it.239 In 2014, after the BLM exhausted all 
administrative solutions, federal agents attempted to seize his cattle.240 
They were met by a militia of hundreds of armed protestors and the 
agents were forced to give up on their attempts when the situation was 
 
235 See Agribusiness, OPEN SECRETS, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.php?Ind=A (last visited Nov. 4, 2020). 
236 Wrabley Jr., supra note 182, at 98; Western Grazing, supra note 182, at 728 ( onl  
two percent of U.S. beef cattle production is attributable to public lands . ). 
237 GRAZING FEES, supra note 93, at 7; see generally Donahue, supra note 16, at 260-61. 
238 Christina Sewell, Essay, Removing the Meat Subsidy: Our Cognitive Dissonance 
Around Animal Agriculture, 73 COLUM. J. OF INT L AFF. (Feb. 11, 2020) 
https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/removing-meat-subsidy-our-cognitive-dissonance-around-
animal-agriculture. 
239 GRAZING FEES, supra note 93, at 7. 
240 Id. 
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close to violence.241 Criminal charges from this episode are still being 
litigated.242 This story illustrates that there will be vocal opposition to 
permit fee increases, but it does not represent the majority of ranchers 




The BLM and the FS programs that regulate federal cattle grazing in 
the Western United States are broken and inequitable. Operating under a 
misguided permit fee formula created nearly five decades ago, the 
agencies lose tens of millions of dollars annually running their grazing 
programs. All the while, cattle are damaging the land and waterways of 
the West that belong to the American people. Moreover, the cattle are 
releasing significant quantities of potent GHGs, increasing the rate by 
which the Earth is warming which will only further complicate cattle 
production and human life.  
Americans need not be resolute to this bleak future. As the battle 
against climate change rages on and potentially turns the corner toward 
more collective action, cattle production will have its time under the 
microscope.243 The B.E.E.F. system is an increase in the floor permit 
rate, coupled with a return to market-based fee principles by auctioning 
the permit rights. This is a straightforward change and compromise that 
will decrease government subsidies and mitigate GHG emissions, while 
allowing ranchers to utilize the land for a fraction of the cost of private 
permits
 
241 Controversy Over Nevada Rancher Cliven Bundy, Explained, VOX (May 14, 2015, 
10:23 AM) https://www.vox.com/2014/8/14/18080508/nevada-rancher-cliven-bundy-
explained. 
242 Kirk Siegler, Cliven Bundy Armed Standoff Case Going Back to Court, NPR (May 29, 
2020, 6:13 AM) https://www.npr.org/2020/05/29/863906893/cliven-bundy-armed-
standoff-case-going-back-to-court. 
243 A provision of the Green New Deal already addresses livestock production saying the 
mobili ation effort will require working collaboratively with farmers and ranchers in the 
United States to remove pollution and greenhouse gas emissions from the agricultural 
sector as much as is technologically feasible, including  (i) by supporting family 
farming; (ii) by investing in sustainable farming and land use practices that increase soil 
health; and (iii) by building a more sustainable food system that ensures universal access 
to health  food.  Recogni ing the Dut  of the Federal Government to Create a Green 
New Deal, H.R. 109, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019). 
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